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Abstract: Robert Parker is an esteemed, somewhat controversial wine-critic. Since 1978, Parker
has assigned every wine he tastes a score between 50 and 100. He uses this method to
communicate to both consumers and producers his opinion of the quality, taste, and aging
potential of the wine. Between the years 2005 and 2015, Robert Parker graded 115 wines from
the French region of Provence. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether and to what extent
Robert Parker’s grades affect the price of wine. Through descriptive statistics and regression
analysis of Robert Parker’s grade and year of production on the average price, I assess the effects
of one expert’s opinion on the price of Provençal wine. My results show that, while there is a
statistically significant relationship between Robert Parker’s grade and the price of wine, the
relationship between the two variables has not varied considerably over the past ten years. In
addition, my results show an indifference on the part of Provençal wine-producers in regards to
pricing based on the grades their wines receive from the wine-critic. This led me to the
conclusion that the relationship between price of wine and grade is not as strong as hypothesized.
This is an interesting finding given the prevalence of consumer reports and expert-opinion based
journals for consumable goods.
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Introduction
Wines that have any aspirations of success are sent to world-renowned wine critic Robert
Parker to be tasted. On a scale of 50 to 100, he assigns grades to each wine based on the aroma,
color, taste, etc. With 51 different, possible ratings, his grade can be a wine’s death knell or the
jetpack that sends it shooting towards success. I will be looking at the effect of these grades on
the wines’ price over the course of ten years with resources including grades that Robert Parker
has assigned wines produced in the Provence region of France. The grades published by Robert
Parker are for his international audience and not specifically the French wine-consumers. Were
his grades tailored towards the wine drinkers native to the selected region of study, variables like
grape would be deemphasized in favor of characteristics like region or award-winning producers.
Other resources used for this thesis include The Journal of Wine Economics and the Wine
Spectator.
The Parker grades are generally published in the spring of each year, about six to seven
months after the grape harvest and before the wine prices are established. Since 1994, each
spring Robert Parker visits Bordeaux to taste and evaluate the latest wines of that region. Parker
publishes his findings in the April issue of The Wine Advocate, his bimonthly journal. Wine
producers fix their market prices in the weeks and months after. The market usually opens at the
end of April, and lasts until June, giving producers the possibility to incorporate the information
contained in the Parker grades. On the scoring method, Robert Parker (2001) has said, “Scoring
permits rapid communication of information to expert and novice alike.” That is, if he wants to
communicate to consumers that this wine tastes exceptional and offers a high utility, he will
score it higher to indicate that.
My hypothesis is that, over the past ten years, Provençal wine producers have recognized
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consumers’ growing dependence on Robert Parker when they purchase a bottle. When
consumers are aware that a wine has merited a high score, they feel comfortable paying a higher
price. Wine producers, similarly, feel comfortable assigning a higher price to their well-rated
bottles and are doing so more now than ten years ago. My thesis looks into whether and to what
extent Parker’s tastes, which are publicized for consumers and wine producers to see, shift the
demand curve. The price of wine, like most consumption goods, is determined by both demand
and supply factors. The quantity of wine produced, the cost of inputs, the average income of
consumers, and people’s preferences all play a role in determining how to price a wine.
However, in my thesis, I am isolating the demand side of the economic model. The belief is, in
assigning high grades to wine, Robert Parker shifts the demand curve out and consequently the
price of the wine increases. In the same vein, Robert Parker shifts the demand curve back by
assigning a low grade and the price decreases. I want to determine just how much of a role
Robert Parker’s ratings play in that relationship and how the relation has changed over time. The
specific question being asked is: how has the quantitative relationship between Robert Parker
wine grades and prices of wines produced in the region of Provence changed in ten years?
This thesis speaks to how malleable consumers and producers are in the face of an
expert’s opinions. Plenty of consumable goods (wine included) are appraised and reviewed in,
e.g., Consumer Reports, which are disseminated to the public. The general belief is that, with so
much variety in the aisles of stores (including the wine aisle), the consumer is victim to choiceoverload. To combat the overload, consumers may look to experts to help determine their
willingness to purchase and how much they are willing to pay.
If my analysis demonstrates a growing and strong relationship between price and the
expert-rating, one can assume both sides of the counter (in regards to consumers of Provençal
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wines) are actively paying attention to the opinion of one expert (Robert Parker) in the field of
wine. If my analysis demonstrates otherwise, one can begin to make assumptions that Provençal
wine consumers and producers are disregarding the expert’s opinion when it comes to buying
and pricing – in other words, Provençal wine consumers trust their own preferences (or the
preferences of third parties other than Robert Parker), and wine producers trust their own pricing
strategies.
Selected Region of Study: Provence
The region of Provence is 150 miles wide, covering a surface area of 65,000 acres. It
spans the Cote d’Azur to the Rhone River Valley. There are a total of approximately twelve
Wine Regions in France. Each region cultivates a particular set of grapes that lend to its climate.
A nice dry Rosé, using Grenache and Syrah grapes, is easily produced in the South of France
where it is hot. A deep oaky Merlot comes from Bordeaux where rain is more abundant year
round. Provence specifically produces Grenache, Cinsault, Syrah, Mourvedre, Tibouren,
Carignan, and Cabernet Sauvignon. The main Appellations in Provence are Cotes de Provence,
Coteaux d’Aix-en-Provence, and Coteaux Varois en Provence. A grower is restricted as to what
kinds of grapes can be grown, how the grapes are grown, and how many tons can be harvested.
The Cotes de Provence spans 49,000 acres and produces normally 123 million bottles or
924,000 hectoliters. Production consists of approximately 89% rosé, 7.5% red, and 3.5% white.
There are 372 private cellars and 38 cooperative cellars. Producers are authorized a yield of
55hl/hectare but the average yield comes in at 46hl/hectare.
The Coteaux d’Aix-en-Provence is smaller, with 10,000 acres, producing 27 million
bottles or 202,000 hectoliters. Production is approximately 83% rosé, 12.5% red, and 4.5%
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white. There are 65 private cellars in the region, twelve cooperative cellars. Authorized yield is
60 hl/hectare but average yield is 49 hl/hectare.
Finally the last major area in the region of Provence is the Coteaux Varois en Provence.
There are 6,000 acres of vineyards in this area, with 16 million bottles (121 hectoliters) produced
yearly. Rosé makes up 89% of production, red 8%, and white 3%. There are 75 private cellars
and ten cooperative cellars. Authorized yield is 59 hl/hectare but average yield is 47 hl/hectare.
Data from this research was obtained through the Wine Advocate, a global bimonthly
publication featuring the assigned grades of wine given by esteemed wine critic Robert Parker.
The available information includes the price, grape, rating, color, appellation, and year. There is
a subscription fee to access the Wine Advocate wine-ratings but the information is disseminated
quickly. While I paid a fee to obtain the data, the average consumer need only Google a wine in
order to get at least a good sense of its Robert Parker rating.
This analysis seeks to determine whether and to what extent the rating of Robert Parker
has an effect on the price of wine. Namely, it will shed insight into the strength of the
relationship between grades and success and, moreover, the current state of that strength. Are
wine connoisseurs looking to Robert Parker more or less now than they were in 2005? The
models utilized are basic consumer demand and elasticity of demand. While consumers may trust
Robert Parker to point them in the direction of an en-primeur wine, there is still a limit to which
they are willing to pay. I will be searching to quantify the amount of influence directly on prices.
This analysis will also provide information on how wine-producers of Southern France depend
on the wine critic Robert Parker and on how the relationship between grade and price of wines
produced in the Provence region of France has changed and potentially strengthened over the last
ten years.
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Currently there exist studies of the macroeconomic determinants of wine prices,
empirical analysis of wine firms in France, studies of wine scores in Bordeaux, and world market
studies on French wine. However, I have yet to come across any specific analyses that look
specifically at the region of Provence, or narrow the relationship to score and price.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: First, I will provide a literature review of
previous studies, which are predominantly analyses of the effects of expert wine ratings on price.
Second, I will provide background information and context on the relationship between Robert
Parker’s grades and the prices of French wines of a different region. Third, I will present my data
set with accompanying summary statistics and analysis. This will include regression analysis of
my data. Finally, I conclude with the significant economic implications of my thesis. By way of
clarification, I will refer to grade, score, and rating interchangeably throughout this thesis.
Literature Review
The relationship between ratings given by wine critics and the success of wine is a
thoroughly analyzed topic for which there is an ample amount of economic research. The
American Association of Wine Economics has devoted many articles entirely to how expert
ratings affect prices. The following articles provided a starting point for my research as they each
investigate the apparent correlation and causation of expert ratings and success of wine. On the
other hand, the amount of research done on Provençal wines and, more specifically, their relation
to expert ratings, is scarce. The literature reviewed spans from 1994 to 2013 and will not be
organized chronologically. Sources span from the Journal of Wine Economics to the American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics.
In their paper “The impact of gurus: Parker grades and en-primeur wine prices,” Ali,
Lecocq, and Visser (2005) investigated the impact of Robert Parker’s oenological grades on
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Bordeaux wine prices. This investigation will be useful to my thesis as it analyzes what the
relationship was like ten years ago, though not in the chosen region of my study. Ali, Lecocq,
and Visser (2005) studied the impact of Parker’s grades on the en primeur wine prices, i.e., the
prices determined by the chateau owners when the wines are still very young. The Parker grades
are generally published in the spring of each year, before the wine prices are established. This is
about six to seven months after the grape harvest. As previously stated in the Introduction, each
spring Robert Parker comes to Bordeaux to taste and score the latest wines. He publishes the
scores in his bimonthly journal, in the April issue. The en primeur prices are fixed by the chateau
owners in the weeks and months thereafter Parker’s publication (the en primeur market usually
opens at the end of April, and lasts until June). This timeline gives the producers the possibility
to incorporate the information contained in the Parker grades. In 2003, Parker did not visit
Bordeaux in the spring to taste the wines produced in 2002. This gap gave Ali, Lecocq, and
Visser the opportunity to investigate the effects of the relationship. The wine grades were
published much later, in the autumn, after the determination of the prices. This unusual timeline
was investigated by the authors to estimate a Parker effect. The authors found that, on average,
the effect of a good review is equal to a 2.80 euros increase per bottle of wine. They also
estimated grade-specific effects, and used these estimates to predict what the prices would have
been had Parker attended the spring tasting in 2003.
Lecocq and Visser (2006) conducted another study on the relation between expert ratings
and wine prices entitled What Determines Wine Prices: Objective vs. Sensory Characteristics.
Their objective was to determine which variables significantly affect the price of Bordeaux and
Burgundy wines. In their study, wines were evaluated via blind-tasting sessions. This evaluation
differed from grades published in wine guides or magazines, in the sense that the blind-tasters
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assigned their grades without being influenced by the name of the wine, its price, or its prior
rankings. Within this study, Lecocq and Visser (2006) attempted to solve what they describe as
the “price puzzle.” Regarding the conclusion of their price-quality relationship investigation, the
authors’ results indicated that characteristics that are directly revealed to the consumer upon
inspection of the bottle and its label (grape, year and appellation) explain the major part of price
differences. Sensory variables, the qualities an expert like Robert Parker is most definitely
looking for, do not appear to play an important role. These sensory variables would include
aromatic intensity, evaluation of taste, persistence of taste, and presence of firm tannins (which
indicates a wine’s ability to age in a positive manner). Out of fifteen sensory characteristics
tested in the 2006 study by Lecocq and Visser, only two or three had a significant impact in the
hedonic price equation. The basic premise of the hedonic pricing method is that the price of a
marketed good is related to its characteristics. Hedonic pricing is a model identifying price
factors according to the concept that price is determined by both internal characteristics of the
good being sold and external factors affecting it. Therefore, with only two or three sensory
variables significantly affecting the price of wine in Lecocq and Visser’s 2006 study, one can
assume that consumers are looking more towards the grape, year, and region when determining
their willingness to pay.
My thesis is not unique in its investigation of a price-quality relationship of wine. There
have been many previous papers that looked at the determinants of prices and attempted to report
estimation results of hedonic price functions. In the analyses underlying these papers, wine
prices are regressed on a set of characteristics in order to determine which characteristics have a
significant effect. Oczkowski (1994) applied the method to Australian table wine and included in
his set of characteristics attributes that are objective and easily observable for the average
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consumer (year, region, grape). Oczkowski also included the grades that are published in a
popular Australian wine guide. Grades were measured on a five-point scale, and Oczkowski
showed that, by introducing dummy variables for the five levels, wine prices increase with the
rating level.
Ashenfelter has contributed two studies that relate to my thesis: one in 1995 with
Ashmore and Lalonde, studying Bordeaux wines, and another with Byron in 1995 for Australian
wines. The studies consider year and weather conditions that prevailed during the growing
season as characteristics, and show that these variables alone explain more than 80% of the price
variation in their samples. Ginsburgh, Monzak, and Monzak (1994) applied their hedonic price
method to a sample of Médoc wines. Médoc is another wine-producing region of France. The
data set of Ginsburg, Monzak, and Monzak allowed the authors to analyze the price effects of
weather, reputation, natural endowments (soil, exposure of the vineyards or grapes) among other
sorts of production factors. Perhaps the most important finding from this research is that
technology and weather conditions explained two-thirds of the price variation. Moreover, the
proportion of explained variance increased to almost 85% once the reputation variable is added.
The previously mentioned articles and studies took place in a time when Robert Parker
had gained some notoriety, but had not yet reached peak levels of supposed influence. In 2009,
Robin Goldstein published a book review of Robert Parker’s “World’s Greatest Wine Values
under $25” in which he declared, “Robert Parker was not the first wine critic to employ a 100point scale, but it was he that etched the paradigm of attaching numbers to wine into the
collective consciousness of the gustatory media. Parker’s leading competitors in America—
Stephen Tanzer, Wine Spectator, Wine & Spirits, Wine Enthusiast—all currently use 100-point
rating scales.” Stephen Tanzer and Wine Spectator were used as independent variables in the
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2011 study by Grocekus and Nottebaum, which I will review below. If anything, the mention of
the two in this book review by Goldstein only further underlines the small yet powerful echelon
of expert wine critics. With so few in the game, expert wine critics’ influence on wine consumers
may have a strong correlation.
Both the Wine Spectator and Robin Goldstein made appearances again in 2009.
Goldstein, Ashenfelter, and Riddell (2009) from the American Association of Wine Economics
asked the question, “Do Expert Ratings Measure Quality?” Though Robert Parker’s grades in
particular did not make an appearance in this study, the scrutiny on the overall effect of experts’
opinions may provide insight for my thesis. The study was done in response to the large scandal
that arose when the magazine Wine Spectator gave its Award of Excellence to a fictional
restaurant with a fictional wine list in Italy. Understandably, the validity of Wine Spectator
awards was brought into question. Goldstein, Ashenfelter, and Riddell (2009) set out to examine
alternative theories of what the Wine Spectator ratings reflect in consumer preferences and
restaurant pricing.
With data from more than 1,700 restaurants, Goldstein, Ashenfelter, and Riddell’s study
went farther into examining décor quality, service quality, and food quality through regression
analysis. Relevant to my thesis topic, the three concluded from their study that restaurants with a
Wine Spectator award cost more than other restaurants with comparable food, service, and décor.
Furthermore, the authors concluded that the Wine Spectator award could be interpreted as a
signal to consumers of an overpriced restaurant. They also concluded that, in receiving the Wine
Spectator award, restaurants are “allowed” to charge more. The study emphasized that, by
making a payment to the Wine Spectator, any restaurant can generally assure itself that it will
receive the award (as was done by the fictional restaurant previously mentioned). The magazine
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collects a $250 fee from each of the 4,000 applicants and a vast majority of those applicants
receive awards. The magazine receives gross revenues of over one million US Dollars from
those application fees. What can be gleaned from this 2009 study is that, in the food and drink
industry, expert opinions and awards act as a signal to consumers and producers/sellers,
regardless of the integrity of the experts. The acquisition of an award (even one that has been
publicly proven to rely more on a payment than actual quality) communicates to consumers that
they should feel comfortable paying larger sums of money and communicates to owners of
restaurants that they should feel comfortable charging more.
More recently, Gokcekus and Nottebaum (2011) contributed to the Journal of Wine
Economics with the pressing question, “To whose rating should a wine drinker pay attention?”
Gokcekus and Nottebaum compare the effect of tastes of regular consumers captured by
community tasting notes to the effect of expert ratings. These experts include Robert Parker, the
Wine Spectator, and Stephen Tanzer. The dilemma the authors sought to investigate is perhaps
familiar: a wine-drinking consumer decides to buy a bottle from a particular region. While she
may know which grape she prefers, or even what year, she is uncertain about the further
decision-making. Thus, she turns to the wine-experts. Gokcekus and Nottebaum (2011)
investigated whom she relies upon and how strongly. This question in particular is a difficult one
seeing as taste is a fundamentally subjective issue. The authors found that, for a randomly
selected sample of 120 2005 Bordeaux wines, Stephen Tanzer’s scores are most closely
associated with the community ratings (defined below); and, when compared to expert ratings,
average price paid for a bottle of wine is more highly correlated with median community scores.
In order to accomplish their study, Gokcekus and Nottebaum collected data from
CellarTracker. It is the world’s largest wine social networking site in both number of catalogued
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bottles and number of listed tasting notes. Its database contains more than 1.8 million
“community tasting notes” in addition to 300,000 professional reviews. Community tasting notes
and ratings are available for all wines in Gokcekus and Nottebaum’s sample. In addition to
community tasting notes, (a) the average score, (b) the median score, (c) the average number of
ratings, and (d) the average price paid are available as statistical information. The evaluating
community members had purchased 2,928 bottles of the wines in the sample for an average price
paid of $109/bottle and generated 35 evaluations on average per wine, with average and median
scores of 91.4 and 91.8, respectively. Out of 120 wines in the authors’ sample, Robert Parker
evaluated 107. For these 107 wines, the average community score was 91.66 and the average
Robert Parker score (the “RP score”) was 93.24. The authors ran a two-sample t-test (with
unequal variances) to check if the 1.58 points difference between community score and the RP
score was statistically significant. The t-statistic was 4.58 with a critical t-value of 1.97. The null
hypothesis that there is no difference between community and RP average scores was rejected.
Friberg and Grönqvist (2012) studied the effects of expert reviews on the demand for
wine in their study entitled “Do Expert Reviews Effect the Demand for Wine?” They examined
the demand for wines in Sweden using five years of weekly data on sales, advertising, and expert
reviews. The authors found that the effect of a favorable review peaked in the week after
publication with an increase in demand of 6 percent. The effect remained significant for more
than 20 weeks. What’s more, Friberg and Grönqvist also found small demand-enhancing effects
of neutral reviews and no evidence of important negative effects from unfavorable reviews.
This selection of literature above focuses on the relationship between expert ratings (most
specifically, Robert Parker) and economic success of different wines. My specific thesis omits
many of the variables mentioned above such as weather conditions, technology, and other
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production factors. Keeping this omission in mind, another study I will include in this literature
review is “Macroeconomic Determinants of Wine Prices” (Jiao 2016). Jiao’s study took on an
empirical approach to identify the macroeconomic determinants of fine wine prices and
estimated their impacts on a monthly database from 1996 to 2015. This period captured
information on different stages of the development of the fine wine market along with the
macroeconomic fluctuations during the last twenty years. Jiao chose 2004 as a breakpoint where
fine wines started to be more financialized and behave more sensitively to the economic cycles.
Her study accounted for the weakening US Dollar, the slowdown of economic growth in
emerging markets since 2011, as well as the recent depreciation of national currencies. She
concluded that the financialization of the wine market had provoked volatility in wine prices.
Jiao concluded other factors such as included money supply, real interest rate, and the growth of
investment funds have recently affected wine prices. This macroeconomic perspective should be
able to explain some of the variation in my particular sample data set on a more global, larger
scale.
In this literature selection, there is an obvious emphasis on the region of Bordeaux,
Burgundy, and certain wine-producing regions of Australia. There is a gap in research done on
Provençal wines. With this thesis, I can begin to scrutinize the specific Provence winemaking
region and its relation to wine expert ratings. This would fill a void in the previous literature that
has not yet been touched upon by economists. My thesis will also fill the void in these studies
surrounding the development of the relationship between Robert Parker ratings and prices for
wine.
The French region of Provence is the world’s largest wine region specializing in dry rosé.
As demonstrated by the information given above regarding the three main appellations, rosé is
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produced on a much larger scale than red or white wine in Provence. This may not seem
particularly significant until one considers the growing thirst amongst consumers for the
Provençal pink drink. In 2014, exports of rosé from Provence to the United States increased by
29%. In 2015, prompted by the extreme spike in consumer demand for the wine specialty of
Provence, the popular magazine Vanity Fair published an article entitled “When Did Rosé
Become a Thing?”. Journalist Alex Beggs wrote, “The rosé from the popular Provence winery
Triennes, first arrived to the U.S. in 2010 in a shipment of 55,000 bottles; so far this year they’ve
already sold 200,000.” (Beggs 2015) This quote speaks directly to the region and time period of
my study and emphasizes a more global spotlight on Provence. While my thesis topic will look
into Robert Parker’s relationship with all the wines of Provence, rosé could play a significant
role as it has grown in such popularity over the last few years, and a higher demand by itself may
have encouraged producers to raise prices.
The second gap in knowledge addressed by my thesis relates not just to the relationship
between expert ratings and wine pricing, but the strength and current state of that relationship.
Development of the relationship between grade and price is not an aspect that I have seen
analyzed in previous studies. I have yet to come across a study or journal article that analyzes
how the influence of ratings on consumers has changed over time.
Data and Variables
To examine the development of the relationship between Provençal wine grades and
price, I collected data from Robert Parker’s Wine Advocate online journal. On this site, every
wine he has sampled and graded is available for the consumer, as well as the wine’s price in US
Dollars. In fact, for uniformity, the only prices I am using in this study are those from his
website. On the Wine Advocate website, it is specified that the wine prices are derived from
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current retail prices received from WineAlert and WineSearcher. The prices are updated
periodically. For this thesis, price is acting as my dependent, resulting variable. Grade is the
independent, explanatory variable.
To collect the initial sample set, specific criteria were set to obtain the most conclusive
and accurate sample set of wine prices and ratings. The first parameter on the sample set was that
wines analyzed had to have been produced and bottled between the years 2005 and 2015. This
characteristic of the sample set is important because this thesis only studies the relationship
between rating and price over the last ten years. While Parker and his system have been around
for a while, and the wines of Provence for much longer, the study is meant to give insight into
his more recent effect on the market.
The next criteria utilized for the sample set was that the wines selected were only
produced in the Provence region of France. With the growing demand for Provençal rosé, the
region is gaining popularity amongst consumers. Observed in the literature review, a large body
of work has been done on regions like Bordeaux. I believe the reputation and notoriety of wines
coming from Bordeaux could give biased results or skew the data. Consumers’ previous
familiarity with wines of Bordeaux, Burgundy, Champagne, or other branded regions suggests
they may be willing to pay more than the average price for a bottle of wine if it is produced in
those geographic spots.
The rest of the data section will be organized in the following manner: I will provide
background information to offer a perspective into the variation in pricings among wines. I will
then complete descriptive statistics on my collected data set. (See Tables 1-5) Finally,
regressions of the data set will be run and analyzed.
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Before I introduce the samples, I will provide some figures for context. In recent years,
specifically in the selected region of Provence, there has been a large variation in the prices of
wine. A 2014 Provence rosé with a 91 rating costs $94 on average. A 2012 Provence blend of
Mourvedre and Syrah with an 88 rating costs $40 on average. A 2015 Provence Cinsault with an
89 rating costs an average $22 per bottle. A 2015 Provence Rosé with an 87 rating costs $16 on
average. The range in scores is 4 points while the range in price is $78.
More context is given in the following analysis of Chateauneuf-du-Pape wines in Table 1.
Table 1: Price of 100-Point Wines
Year
RP Grade
Price
2005
100
$383.00
2005
100
$376.00
2007
100
$310.00
2007
100
$181.00
2007
100
$379.00
2007
100
$301.00
2007
100
$498.00
2009
100
$236.00
2009
100
$642.00
2010
100
$236.00
2010
100
$175.00
2010
100
$200.00
2010
100
$241.00
2010
100
$446.00
2010
100
$422.00
Avg. Price
$335.07

Robert Parker has not, in the past ten years, given a wine that was produced in Provence a
grade of 100 points. The nearest region receiving, on multiple occasions, the perfect score is
from a sub-region of the Rhône area: Chateauneuf-du-Pape. From 2005 to 2010, fifteen wines
received 100 points. Table 1 (above) shows all fifteen and their respective prices, as well as the
average price overall. The range in score is 0 but the range in price is $467. The average price of
a wine from Chateauneuf-du-Pape that received a perfect score is $335.07. The minimum price
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of such a bottle is $175. The most expensive, maximum price is $642. This data demonstrates the
enormous variation in prices, despite the complete lack of variation in grade. Evidently, there are
many factors that determine how much a bottle costs. Receiving a high score perhaps legitimizes
a minimum price of $175, but it does not establish a maximum. Now that some context and
background information has been given, analysis of the selected region can begin.
I will continue this collection of data, including year, price, and score, providing all the
descriptive statistics in the Provençal region. As one can see in the range in prices from the small
data set of Chateauneuf-du-Pape wines (Table 1), there can be a large variation in prices,
regardless of score. Therefore, it is very possible that I will not be able to pin down a linear
relationship between the Robert Parker score and the price of a wine from the Provençal region.

Table 2: Average Price and Grade 2005-2015
Year
Number of wines Average price Average grade
2005
15
$39.87
88.53
2006
8
$32.13
88.88
2007
13
$27.85
89.08
2008
8
$29.13
88.13
2009
10
$24.90
88.10
2010
9
$22.89
89.33
2011
13
$28.46
89.54
2012
8
$27.50
89.38
2013
5
$28.00
89.40
2014
18
$38.44
88.89
2015
8
$26.63
87.88
Total
115
$30.78
88.83

Table 2 is a collection of the average price and grade of wines from Provence scored by Robert
Parker spanning the years 2005-2015. Parker graded 115 such wines total. Parker graded the
most wines (18) in 2014, and in the prior year, 2013, he only graded five. Demonstrated by Table
2, there does not appear to be a pattern with the number of wines scored each year. The only
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exception is the mode of eight wines scored for four separate years (2006, 2008, 2012, and
2015).
The analysis between these two variables is limited, given the small sample size of data
available. A larger sample size, as well as uniform sub-samples, would have been ideal for this
analysis. The average prices and scores may not be considered significant due to the variation of
number of wines scored.
The median rating for Provençal wines between 2005-2015 is 89 with a mode of 90. The
median price between 2005-2015 is $21 with a mode of $16. From these summary statistics, it
can be gleaned that the average wines (produced in 2005-2015) deserving of Robert Parker’s
tasting will cost between $16 (the mode) and $30.78 (the average). Moreover, any Provençal
wine receiving a score at or above 88 should cost within that range. Looking at the average
prices spanning the last ten years, if a unique wine has a score of 88, one can establish a
minimum price of $22.89 (the minimum average price, circa 2010). As well, one should not
expect that same bottle to cost more than $39.87 (the maximum average price, circa 2005).
Isolating the first and last year of analysis, the price has varied from an average of $39.87
per bottle (2005) to $26.63 (2015). The change in average price ($39.87-26.63) from 2005 to
2015 is $13.24. My hypothesis is that wines with lower grades would be priced lower. Armed
with the negative $13.24 decrease in price, I would assume that the average grade has also fallen
in the last ten years. But as the table indicates, that is not the case.
While the total range in average price ($39.87-22.89) is $16.98, the total range in average
grade (89.54-87.88) is 1.66. With just these comparisons alone, it is difficult to pin down a
precise relationship between price and grade. The lack of variation in scores means either that the
smallest decimal points need to be examined more closely, or that different summary statistics
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will tell more of the picture. Another suggestion is that Robert Parker has been making a
conscious decision to assign grades between 80-90 over the course of the last ten years. It is very
possible that Parker has avoided tasting wines he anticipates will receive a low score. As
mentioned previously, a particularly high score from Parker can be the reason a certain bottle of
wine shoots towards success. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a low score has negative
connotations and Robert Parker may be consciously avoiding the negative reactions associated
with assigning a low score. This reasoning may explain the miniscule range in grades. Later in
this section, the standard deviations within isolated years will be analyzed, and a simple linear
regression will be run.
Shown in Table 3 below, the maximum single price for a bottle of wine from Provence
over the last ten years was $149 in 2005, a wine meriting a score of 95. For comparison, the
minimum price was $7 for a 2010 wine that received a score of 85. The highest score given out
was a 98, to a 2010 bottle that cost $70.
The year with the highest average price was 2005. The year with the lowest average price
was 2010. That is to say, wine producers in the Provence region priced their wines in a manner
reflecting a belief that consumers would pay an average of approximately $40 a bottle in the year
2005, but priced 2010 wines reflecting a belief that consumers would pay only approximately
$23. More specifically, wine producers believed this about consumers who drank wine that was
deserving of Robert Parker’s opinion.
Although the sample size is small (Parker scored 15 wines in 2005 and 9 in 2010), one
assumption is that consumers’ willingness to pay decreased in the first half of this ten-year
analysis. This is somewhat surprising, considering the variety in average score from this first half
only ranged 1.23 points. As discussed in the literature review of this thesis, Provence is the
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world’s largest wine region specializing in dry rosé. In 2014, Provence rosé wine exports to the
United States increased by 29%. Another possible assumption is that the decrease in prices by
Provençal producers over the last ten years was intentional in order to incentivize wineconsumers to purchase more. Although this thesis neglects to take the supply-side price
determinants into account, another variable, which influences price, is the amount of wine
produced. A deeper inspection of prices follows in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: Maximum and Minimum Prices 2005-2015
Year
Max price Min price Range
2005
149
13
136
2006
68
15
53
2007
101
15
86
2008
62
15
47
2009
71
12
59
2010
70
7
63
2011
55
16
39
2012
41
13
28
2013
34
16
18
2014
90
12
78
2015
44
15
29

Though the sample size of each year is not consistent in terms of number of wines
graded, one important indication from Table 3 is the lowering variance in prices as one moves
through the ten-year period. Demonstrated in Table 3, the average range in prices from 2005 to
2010 is $74. The average range in prices from 2010 to 2015 is only $42.50. Prices are becoming
more uniform as the decade progresses. Table 4 (below) only strengthens this observation. While
one cannot say there is a consistent decrease in the standard deviation of the average price, it is
difficult to ignore the exceptionally high figure in 2005 (47.06) and relatively low figures of
2012, 2013, and 2015 (9.47, 7.65, and 10.38 respectively) (Table 4). An outlier occurs in 2014
(during which the standard deviation in price was 24.68). The lower deviations in the second half
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of the time period suggest consumers’ becoming more price sensitive. As time move forwards,
wine-consumers have developed a reference point, an expectation of how much they normally
spend on a bottle from Provence. A particularly expensive bottle (even one that has received a
grade between 95 and 100) does not particularly attract the consumer, and wine-producers may
have recognized that. It could also suggest that consumers are treating Provençal wines as a
generic product more so now than they were in 2005. Provence is a less well-known region of
France and without the notoriety of Bordeaux or Bourgogne; wine consumers may feel less
inclined to spend money on a Provençal bottle. Name recognition has influence on consumers’
willingness-to-pay, and it is possible that wine-producers have recognized that when they price
their bottles.
Table 4: Standard Deviations in Grade and Price
Year
Stan. Dev in Grade Stan. Dev in Price
2005-2015
2.84
24.11
2005
3.74
47.06
2006
1.81
17.71
2007
1.49
24.19
2008
2.53
20.65
2009
2.88
17.3
2010
3.94
18.36
2011
1.94
12.86
2012
3.2
9.47
2013
1.67
7.65
2014
3.64
24.68
2015
2.48
10.38
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Model, Results, Regression Analysis
Table 5: Summary Statistics of First Regression
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Price
30.78261
24.10677
Year
5.86087
3.295097
Rating
88.83478
2.837501

Max
7
1
77

149
11
98

Table 5 lists the summary statistics for each variable in the regression. As previously
mentioned, I interchangeably use “rating” in place of grade and score. Ratings are always on a
100-point scale. The variable “Price” is described in US Dollars. Before running a regression to
analyze the relationships between variables, I converted the years to periods. Year 2005 becomes
time period 1, year 2006 becomes time period 2, and so on until 2015. This modification was
made to the data so that the coefficients could be more easily interpreted. When the single digit
time periods are used in lieu of years, it is less difficult to determine how a one-unit change in a
year may affect the price.
Before running the regression with all three variables, I isolated price and rating. “Price”
remains the dependent Y Variable. The modification to my thesis is that “rating” is the sole
independent X variable. In running this regression first and neglecting the year, I am seeking to
determine how much grade has influenced price over the last ten years.
Y= β0 + β1X + β2X+... βkX
The regression that Stata produced is featured in Table 9.
Price= -229.5553 β0+ 2.931β1(rating)
Table 6: 1st Regression Results
n
115
F(1,113)
15.26
Prob > F
0.0002
R-Squared
0.119
Adj R-Squared
0.1112
Root MSE
22.727
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Table 7: 1st Regression Results Continued
Price
Coefficent Std. Err.
t
Rating
2.930585 0.7501616
Constant
-229.5553
66.67413

P>ltl
3.91
-3.44

95% Conf. Interval
0
1.44438
4.416791
0.001 -361.6488 -97.46182

In the regression reflected in Table 7, compared to the second (see Tables 8-9), R-squared
is 0.119 and adjusted R-squared is 0.1112 (Table 6). 11.9% of the data is explained by the x
variable present: “Price.” In comparison to the second regression below, the F score present here
has increased significantly (7.66 to 15.26), as well as the Probability > F. The p-value from the
first regression is 0.0002, and it increases to 0.0008 in the second regression (Table 8 and Table
6). Within the first regression, this means that there is a 0.0002% chance the x and y variables
are not related. Another figure to consider is the grade coefficient, which changes marginally
between Regressions 1 and 2. The model seems to suggest that a one unit increase in grade will
increase the price by $2.93. Similarly, Ali, Lecocq, and Visser (2005) had concluded a good
review by Robert Parker (dubbed the “Parker Effect) resulted in a 2.80-euro increase in the price
per bottle of the wine. The 0 p-value, as well as the 3.91 t-score, imply statistical significance in
this variable.
I then ran the regression using the Stata Command: regress Price Year Rating. This
command indicates that Price is acting as my dependent, y-variable. “Year” and “Rating” are the
X Variables I will use to determine whether or not there is an overall correlation between
variables. Price= β0 + β1X(year) + β2X(rating)
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Table 8: 2nd Regression Results
# of Observations

115

F(2,112)

7.66

Prob > F

0.0008

R-Squared

0.1203

Adj R-Squared

0.1046

Root MSE

22.811

Table 9: 2nd Regression Results Continued
Price
Coefficent
Std. Err.
T
P>ltl
95% Conf. Interval
Year
-0.2659135 .6485189
-0.41
0.683
-1.550871
Rating
2.937062 0.7531038
3.9
0
1.444883
Constant
-228.5722
66.96385 -3.41
0.001
-361.2525

1.019044
4.429241
-95.8919

The regression is Price= β0 + β1X(year) + β2X(rating) As seen in Table 7, the results
came out to be Price=-228.5722 β0 +-.2659135 β1 (year)+ 2.937062 β2 (rating)
As my thesis focuses on the state and development of the relationship between the Robert
Parker grade and the price of the wine, the null hypothesis I am seeking to reject is: the X
variables “Rating” and “Year” have no influence on the “Price” of a given wine.
Before analyzing the statistical significance, the regression shown in Table 9 implies that
with a positive one-unit increase in the year, the wine becomes .26 cents less expensive. With a
one-unit increase in grade, the bottle becomes $2.94 more expensive. The negative constant
seems to suggest that wines with a score of 0 out of 100 that are not produced in the given time
period start off at a price of negative $228.57. This would suggest that producers pay consumers
over $200 in order to drink this wine, and that simply is not the case.
However, upon further analysis of the data, one can assume that the relationship between
price, year, and grade is weak. The F score is 7.66. The p-value for “rating” (0.000) appears to
indicate that only one variable is statistically significant. P-value refers to statistical significance
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in the sense that if it is 0, there is a 0% chance that the variables are not related. With a p-value
for the variable of year at 0.683, we assume there is a 68.3% chance the two variables are not
related. The test was run with a 95% confidence interval. Since the p-value for year is greater
than alpha 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of this regression, which is that there is no
relationship between the two variables year and price.
However, for the variable “Rating” one observes 0.000 for p-value. There is statistical
significance here. Zero is less than alpha 0.05, and we reject the null hypothesis of no relation
between “price” and “rating”. As well, the t-score for “rating” is 3.9, which is large enough to
support the statistical significance.
The R-squared value of this regression is 0.1203. R squared values indicate what
percentage of the data is explained by the variables present. In taking only year and rating into
account to determine price, 12.03% of the data is explained. That is to say, 12.03% of the price
of wine can be explained by the year and rating of the wine. The adjusted R-squared value, of
which the “adjusted” refers to accounting for the number of independent variables in a
regression, is 0.1046. In this case, 10.46% of the change in price is explained by the variables
present. This is a rather low score and suggests that perhaps additional control variables, such as
production levels or weather conditions, are needed in order to fully explain the y variable.
The next number to take into account is the Root MSE. It is the standard deviation of the
residual in the model. The MSE alone is the variance of the residual in the model. In the case of
this specific regression, Root MSE is 22.811 (demonstrated in Table 8). It is a measure of the
differences between values predicted by a model and the observed true values. With a Root MSE
as large as 22.811, there is an indication that the difference in predicated prices and actual prices
is almost a total of $23. When the overall standard deviation in price is $24.11(Table 4), this
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does not imply a robust model.
Another number that serves as an indicator of the strength of this regression is the
probability > F. This number, shown in Table 9 above is 0.0008. This means, that there is a
0.0008% chance the three variables are not related. Ideally, probability>F would equal 0.
In the final regression run on Stata, the x variable “Year” was converted to 11 dummy
variables. The years 2005 through 2015 become qualitative characteristics, in order to isolate
each year’s unique effect on the variable “price”. D1 =1 if the wine was priced and graded in
2006, D2=1 if the wine was priced and graded in 2007, etc. The Dummy variables equal 0 in
relation to the years in which they were not priced or graded. The results of the regression
involving years as separate dummy variables are seen in Tables 10 and 11.
The R-squared value in Table 10 (0.1822) suggests an 18% of variance in price is
explained by “Rating” and the year of production. The F value (2.09 seen in Table 10) has
lowered in comparison to the last regression, suggesting a weak relationship between the
variables present. On the other hand, the p-value of .0277 implies there is a 2.77% chance the
variables present are not related. This final regression did not support my initial hypothesis
enough to assume a strengthening relationship between the variables “Price” and “Rating” over
the last ten years.
However, what can be gleaned from this final regression is the significance of the
variables “Rating” and “Year2010”. Seen in Table 11, Year2010 has the highest t-score apart
from Rating (-2.01) and the largest coefficient (-19.54). This suggests that Provençal wine was
$20 cheaper on average in that year. This is most likely due to the global recession. This
particular qualitative variable acts as a proxy for all that is going on macro-economically during
the selected time frame. It is not a coincidence that “Year2011” is the only variable with a
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positive coefficient. This variable has the second lowest p-value, suggesting somewhat
statistically significant implications. The combination of these two variables, regarding the
nature of the coefficients and p-values, indicate some of the macroeconomic determinants of
Provençal wine prices. “Rating” has a t-score of 3.99 and a p-value of 0.000 (Table11). Both
these figures suggest a statistically significant relationship between y variable Price and Rating.
The coefficient value attached to “Rating” of 3.076 implies that a one unit change in the grade a
wine is given by Robert Parker results in a $3.076 change in the price. While I was seeking an
observable development in the relationship between the variables “Price” and “Rating” over the
last ten years, my regressions suggest a different story. The abundance of high p-values for each
year variable in Table 11 connotes statistical insignificance. These figures make it difficult to
make any assumptions about the development of the relationship over the past ten years. The
only safe assumption one can take aware from all three linear regressions is that Robert Parker’s
Rating has a small but statistically significant influence on the price of Provençal wines.

Table 10: 3rd Regression Results
Number of observations
F(11,103)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

115
2.09
0.0277
0.1822
0.0949
22.935
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Table 11: 3rd Regression Results Continued
Price
Coefficient Std. Err.
Rating
3.076323 0.7703987
Year2006
-8.792744
10.0443
Year2007
-13.69277
8.70087
Year2008
-9.485502
10.04578

t
3.99
-0.88
-1.57
-0.94

P>ltl 95% Conf Interval
0.000
1.548418
4.604227
0.383 -28.71325
11.12776
0.119 -30.94889
3.563353
0.347 -29.40894
10.43793

Year2009

-13.63359

9.369094

-1.46

0.149

-32.21498

Year2010
Year2011
Year2012
Year2013
Year2014
Year2015
Constant

-19.43884
0.1449723
-14.9559
-14.532
-2.516
-11.2164
-232.49

9.689834
8.725215
10.06177
11.86235
8.022795
10.05365
68.46255

-2.01
-1.66
-1.49
-1.23
-0.31
-1.12
-3.4

0.047
0.1
0.14
0.223
0.754
0.267
0.001

-38.65634
-31.80163
-34.91105
-38.05899
-18.42735
-31.15547
-368.2698

4.947794
0.2213354
2.807179
4.99924
8.993361
13.3953
8.722632
-96.7111

Conclusion
The hypothesis that prompted this thesis was that Provençal wines receiving higher
scores from Robert Parker would be priced more highly now than at the beginning of the last
decade. What I expected to find was a stronger relationship overtime between the price of wine
and the rating it received from Parker. I assumed that a high rating from Robert Parker would
result in an increased willingness-to-pay on the part of consumers, which would be recognized
by wine-producers in the region of Provence. I also assumed that consumers are becoming more
dependent on the expert’s reviews when choosing a wine, which would be reflected in a higher
price of wine based for a high rating. Following my hypothesis, Provençal producers receiving a
high rating would feel comfortable assigning a high price to their recently produced wines,
because they had seen the relationship between grade and price strengthen over time. There
would be significant evidence to believe consumers have become more willing to purchase
expensive wine if it merited a high score from a world-renowned expert. However I am unable to
speak confidently on the development of the relationship between the selected variables. While
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undoubtedly Robert Parker’s ratings play a role in price determination, my data analysis does not
allow for many assumptions regarding the span of time.
The findings are significant because they are an indication of the relationship between an
expert’s and consumers’ preferences, as well as an expert’s ranking of a wine in relation to its
price. What can be gleaned from the findings is that prices of highly rated wines have not
changed very much over the last ten years. While both supply and demand of Provençal wines
have increased, the ratings and subsequent prices are not rising very quickly at all. A decreasing
variation in the average prices of wine was observed, as well as a somewhat statistically
significant relationship between y variable “Price” and x variable “Rating”.
Overall this study helps expand our knowledge of how demand for particular consumer
goods is influenced by expert critiques and consequently priced in the current market. This study
could give further insight into the producers’ pricing strategy and how both sides of the market
are influenced by expert ratings.
The findings can be applied to more than just wine. There are experts in almost every
category of consumer goods. While this research was narrowed down to wines of Provence over
the last ten years, it speaks to market influence in both pricing and demand by expert ratings.
Websites and journals that focus on Consumer Reports are popular because consumers do not
always trust their own preferences when faced with choice overload, as is often the case in the
wine aisle of the supermarket. Consumers look to educate themselves on the quality of goods
through the opinions of experts in the field. The results of this thesis suggest that Provençal wine
producers are not paying as close attention to Robert Parker grades as initially anticipated.
Although wine-producers base a small portion of their pricing strategy on the grade received, this
does not tell the whole story.
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This study is important because it speaks to how much or how little one person’s opinion
of a consumer good can affect the price. Further research related to critics’ scores and pricing
could explore more of the supply side of this Provençal wine study. The results of this thesis
suggest that producers do not base prices solely on critics’ scores.
This research has some limitations and there are several elements I neglected to study
(e.g., production quantity, weather, larger macroeconomic variables) that contribute to the
pricing strategy of Provençal wine producers. The amount of each wine produced for the
specific years was not readily available. Supply has a significant impact on the price, and
because it was not used as a variable, the data may be less indicative of the strength and
development of the relationship between Robert Parker’s scores and the price of Provençal
wines. The research design also lacks a dummy variable for red wine versus white wine versus
rosé. It lacks as well a variable that controls for the supply of wine in each year.
We see evidence of a small, but not altogether statistically insignificant, growth over the
ten-year period in the strength of the relationship between Robert Parker’s grades, and the prices
of the wines.
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